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ABSTRACT

An overview is given of the historical origins and current situation of the American university as an institutional type. The basic frame of reference is a macrosociological one, rather than narrative social history. The major thesis developed is that the nature and problems of the contemporary university can best be understood by examining its shifting relations with its broader social and institutional environment. The large number of works that emerged in the late 1960's and early 1970's about problems in higher educational systems have largely treated those problems from an internal perspective, that is, in relation to inner logic, goals, and developments within the university system. By contrast this study takes an explicitly interinstitutional focus, tracing the historical development and contemporary situation of the American university to the vagaries of its interaction with external agencies and institutions. A brief annotated bibliography is included. (Author/MSE)

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THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY AND ITS INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT: AUTONOMY AND CONSTRAINT

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ABSTRACT

This paper is a brief overview of the historical origins and current situation of the "American university" as an institutional type. The basic frame of reference is a macrosociological one, rather than narrative social history. The major thesis developed is that the nature and problems of the contemporary university can best be understood by examining its shifting relations with its broader social and institutional environment. The plethora of works that emerged in the late '60s and early '70s about problems in higher educational systems have largely treated those problems from an "internal" perspective, that is, in relation to the "inner logic", goals and developments within the university system. By contrast this paper takes an explicity inter-institutional focus, tracing the historical development and contemporary situation of the American university to the vagaries of its interaction with external agencies and institutions throughout the cause of its development. A short annotated bibliography is attached to this report for those wishing further in depth exploration of the issues raised here.

I

This paper is a brief overview of the historical origins of the contemporary "American university" as an institutional type. The basic frame of reference here is a macrosociological one, rather than narrative social history. The major thesis developed is that the nature and problems of the contemporary university can best be understood by examining its shifting relations with its broader social and institutional environment.* The plethora of works that emerged in the late '60s and early '70s about problems in higher educational systems (eg., the student movement, university polity and curriculum reform, etc.**) have largely treated those problems from an "internal" perspective, that is, in relation to the "inner logic", goals and developments within the university system. By contrast, this paper takes an explicitly inter-institutional focus, tracing the historical development and contemporary situation of the American university to the vagaries of it's interaction with external agencies and institutions throughout the course of its development. A short annotated bibliography is attached to this report for those wishing further in depth exploration of the issues raised here.

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*The implicit assumption here is, of course that the "American university" can be treated as a single "institutional type," just as one could speak of the "American nuclear family" or the "secondary school" as abstracted institutional types. This is not to deny that in some respects each university has a unique and ideosyncratic history and character, but rather for purposes of analysis this paper argues that so important are the similarities in history, structure and functioning of the larger state supported and privately endowed universities--or "multiversities" to use Kerr's colorful term--that the assumption of a uniform and highly institutionalized pattern is justified. Furthermore, the concerns of this paper omits from consideration other forms of "higher" (post-secondary) education, such as the four-year liberal arts college or the community college; not because they are unimportant but rather because they occupy a different ecological "niche" in the entire system of American higher education.

**See, for example, Weaver and Weaver, The University and Revolution (Spectrum Books); Scott and Lyman, The Revolt of the Students (Merrill Co.); Wallerstein and Starr, The University in Crisis Reader (Vintage Books); and Becker Campus Power Struggle (Aldine Press) for samples of this literature.

II

The earliest institutions of higher education in America were "liberal arts" colleges based on the English models of Oxford and Cambridge. The curriculum was a rather undifferentiated "classical" one, including Latin, Greek, mathematics, literature and above all, theology. The aim of such an education was not to produce people trained in various occupations and professions so much as it was to produce educated gentlemen or "men of letters" capable of taking their rightful (and high) station in colonial society. Puritan ministers in New England tended to dominate the cultural and moral life in what, it must be remembered, was originally intended as a theocratic society, with little distinction between civil and religious authority. Not only did these religious leaders dominate the intellectual and cultural tone of New England society, but many of them were intellectuals in their own right, trained in classical traditions at English institutions, and presiding over communities that were, according to Hofstadter (1969) extensively intellectual communities (or at least communities in which "learning" was greatly admired). But even if such an education was necessary for elite status in colonial society, it was not organically tied to the colonial economy in any functional sense. Higher education thus had a symbolic value; one went to college to gain or reinforce one's elite status in the community. Thus while education reinforced the system of social stratification in Colonial America -- much as it did in England -- it had few other direct utilitarian consequences. Such colonial colleges were, in fact, "elite" institutions in every sense.

As the frontier progressively deepened and especially as the Alleghenies were crossed, the character of American colleges began to undergo transformation. During this period there arose tensions between the New England and Tidewater airstocracies which controlled the cultural, religious and political machinery of the fledgling republic and the frontiersmen and farmers of the West. This diversification of the population was expressed in "sectional" politics, the

bifurcation of frontier religious sects, and ultimately the creation of educational institutions autonomous from those in New England and the Tidewater regions. Thus the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828 signaled not only the political demise of the Federalist hierarchy in New England, but the growth and vigor of the new political, economic, geographic and cultural groupings in the American West, which were ultimately to transmute American higher education to their own needs.

It was a period of expansion in which many new colleges were founded.* These new colleges tended to be based on particular religious, ethnic, or geographic clienteles, as Jencks and Riesman suggest:

> Nineteenth-century Americans grouped themselves by occupation, social class, religion, sex, locality, and ethnic background, among other things. As the century wore on almost all these groups felt impelled to set up their own colleges, both to perpetuate their distinctive subculture and to give it legitimacy in the larger society. By 1900 there were special colleges for Baptists and Catholics, for men and women, for whites and blacks, for rich and not-so-rich, for North and South, for small town and big city, for adolescents and adults, for engineers, and teachers. We...call these institutions "special interest" colleges and...distinguish them from eighteenth-century colleges which served a relatively unified establishment. In many cases a special interest college served several subcultures simultaneously, blending feminism with the values of the East Coast elite, for example, or mixing Methodism with Texas chauvinism. The number of permutations was almost infinite, and in due course many of them were tried. (1968:2-3)

Not only were there new institutions founded, but the frontier and the growing commercial and industrial economy began to impose their own logic on the development of higher education. First, partly as the result of populist political sentiments hostile to the alleged aristocracy of the coast, there was the growing sentiment that education was for all, not only for the elite. This was first evident, of course, at the elementary level of education, in which knowledge of the "three R's" was increasingly seen as the prerogative of all, but even at higher levels, the notion gradually developed that such

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*According to Tewksbury (1932) roughly 800 colleges were founded by the time of the Civil War, of which about 180 have survived into the twentieth century.

education should be available to all who are talented to profit from it, regardless of social class or economic situation. This "democratic ideal" was practiced, in terms of higher education, largely in the breech during most of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, but it foreshadowed things to come.

Second, the logic of the frontier demanded "practicality" rather than the gentile learning of the cultured New England society. Such a utilitarian view of the purposes of education (as opposed to the "classical" view) grew not only from the rigors of frontier life, which left so little time or money for the luxury of scholarly contemplation, but also -- later -- from the demands of an increasingly diversified and complicated commercial and industrial economy. The legal and political bellweather of such trends was the passage of the Morrill Act in 1862, in which the Federal Government offered money to the states to establish "practical" colleges which offered instruction in "agriculture and mechanics." Most states, predictably, responded to the call, given the opportunities to gain Federal monies. But such "land grant" colleges --as they came to be called--once founded, did not remain as purely vocational and technical schools, for they were run by educators whose aspirations were to compete with the prestigious eastern schools, and thus they assembled at least the outward appearance of "higher education" in the classical sense at their new state schools. Such an education proved to be highly popular with the rising American middle classes, whose mobility depended, unlike the New England elites, upon their acquisition of economically salable skills, but who also wanted a modicum of "higher learning" by which they could distinguish themselves from the working classes, farmers, and masses. Most state universities, especially in the Midwest, have their origins in such land grant institutions.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century the new educational norms of pragmatism and utility began to be developed in other ways as well. American scholars returning from study in Germany brought with them continental values and definitions of what higher education was all about and ultimately founded graduate schools along Germanic lines. These graduate schools were for (1) training of professionals -- that is, doctors, lawyers, and engineers, etc., which had obvious utilitarian consequences for the developing nation, and (2) the training of scientists and the conducting of "pure" scientific research. Though the latter represents a type of "knowledge for knowledge sake" in some respects akin to norms of classical education, this new type of German scholarship was not lost on industrialists and economic elites, who paid generously for the establishment of these new type institutions (eg., at Johns Hopkins, Stanford, and M.I.T.).

Thus it was that in America there developed peculiar institutions composed of a Germanic graduate college grafted onto an English-type liberal arts undergraduate college. State legislatures followed suit by establishing such schools (now universities in the literal sense) on the base of the land grant schools, and even the older and prestigious private schools on the East Coast, such as Harvard and Yale, were swayed by the currents of such "new style" pragmatism and soon established graduate schools of engineering, medicine, law, and business administration of their own. Faculty came to be organized into academic "departments" and scholarly and scientific disciplines, and an emphasis increasingly came to be placed on "research", graduate, and professional education. The undergraduate college of liberal arts (or "Arts and Sciences" as they came to be called) rarely had an autonomous faculty. Thus undergraduate "liberal arts" education came typically to be a second-order educational value among the faculty, except at those exclusive private schools totally committed to undergraduate and "classical" education. Such schools (eg., Vassar, Carelton College) remain today primarily as "grooming schools" for social elites, and consequently are much more committed to the classical values of "pure" learning

and scholarship than the values of practicality and pragmatism which came to animate the larger private and public universities.

The growth of such pragmatic and utilitarian norms for higher education could not have developed, of course, had there not been long term and pervasive changes in the surrounding society which provided a favorable climate for such developments in educational institutions. Between 1850 and 1950 the American economy underwent profound transformations. It is to these transformations we now turn, so that -- hopefully -- the shape and character of the contemporary American university can be more fully understood.

The American economy in the middle of the nineteenth century was closer to the capitalistic "free market" economy of the vision of the classical economists, although such competition in the "market" was never quite pure. Never the less, the American economy at that time probably approximated more closely the vision of Adam Smith than at any time since. Such an economy was composed mainly of a multitude of small competing firms and "family" businesses. Such firms, which Galbraith (1967) has termed the "entrepreneurial firm", were substantially a product of the ambition, fortune, luck, shrewdness, and personality of a single man or a single entended family. Ruthless competition between such entrepreneurial firms in relatively open (or "free") markets ultimately led to the "weeding out" of the economically less efficient -- or less ruthless -- firms, and produced, over the years, the accumulation of huge economic empires. The family dynasties of the DuPonts, the Mellons, and the Rockefellers are prime examples of families which managed, by legal and quasi-legal means to gain control of monopolies, either vertical or horizontal, in various sectors of the (increasingly less) "free" market. (See Ida Tarbell's The History of Standard Oil for perhaps the most thoroughly documented of the "dynasty-building" activities of one family, the Rockefellers).

The entrepreneurial firm, according to Galbraith, was under rather direct personalistic control of its owners; which necessitated the maintenance of rather simple forms of social organization within the firm. Such "managerial"

employees as there were, were employed mainly for their loyalty to the owners, rather than for their technical expertise. In addition, by today's standards, the products of the entrepreneurial firm were rather uncomplicated and demanded a much lower level of industrial technology so that such companies relied extensively on unskilled, hand labor. Thus there was not the necessity to invest heavily in industrial hardware, or highly skilled and "expert" employees, since such long-term capital investments were expensive and could easily prove to be economic liabilities in a changing and fickle market situation. Such an unstable market meant that really long-range planning was impossible, so that there was little need to employ trained economists, market analysts, and organizational planners.

But such a primitive entrepreneurial economy was to prove an unstable arrangement, in the long run, for the logic of the capitalist economy dictated that financial success ultimately went to the largest and "most efficient" producer. Thus all such firms increasingly adopted mechanization, mass production, and the factory system in order to achieve a more "competitive" position in the market. The advantage went, of course, to the larger firms since mechanization, automation, and the development of a more "efficient" (and complex) industrial technology meant the necessity to invest heavily in expensive capital goods and equally expensive human expertise. Such heavy, long-term investments demanded not only that the firm employ economists and market analysts to attempt to predict the long-range state of the market, but that the firm itself increasingly attempted to control the market -- by mass advertising, by sub-rosa collusion and price-fixing with other large firms, and by the acceptance of a modicum of "governmental regulations", all of which produced a more predictable and more stable market than existed in the earlier era of the more primitive entrepreneurial firm.

The developing industrial firm, termed the "technocratic firm" by Galbraith, was increasingly a much larger operation, had more complex and more diversified products, and subsequently evidenced a much more complex pattern of internal division of labor. It not only necessitated the employment of industrial

engineers, draftsmen, architects, chemists, product development experts, and other highly trained personnel dealing directly with production, but it also, because of its very complexity, demanded that decisive control of the day-to-day operations of the corporation be vested in a host of industrial managers, labor relation experts, corporate lawyers, economists, and market specialists, which came to form a managerial bureaucracy. The actual owners of corporations, though still holding "trump cards" over the corporate economy, actually interfered less and less with the daily operation and long-range planning of the technocratic firm, because they did not possess the range of knowledge, skills, and kinds of expertise--and also because they were not available in terms of the sheer numbers necessary to control such huge firms. Indeed, the degree to which the older generation of entrepreneurs, say Henry Ford I, John D. Rockefeller, or Sewell Avery (of Montgomery Ward) "interfered" directly in the operational decision-making of their firms would be unthinkable in the largest technocratic firms of today. Such technocratic firms came increasingly to dominate the economy of America, so that by 1963 about 500 large corporations controlled roughly 68% of the <u>total</u> manufacturing assets in the economy. (Mueller, 1969) Thus, Adam Smith's "free market" of many small and equal producers has evolved into an extensively planned and regulated oligopolistic economy dominated by a few large producers who combine to regulate mass market through sub-rosa collusion, and mass advertising which "stimulates demand" and hence makes the market more stable and predictable. And the government, increasingly since the depression and the "New Deal", has aided such stabilization of the market through "regulation of the economy" by traditional agencies such as the Securities

Exchange Commission,* as well as direct and indirect subsidies to major sections of the economy. (As is becoming increasingly clear, government sponsorship of higher education and "scientific research" was a critical indirect subsidy to the corporate economy). The government, for all practical purposes, has become today the "guarantor of the last resort" for the modern corporate economy.

The effect that these economic transformations had upon the system of social stratification, mobility, and occupational structure in the United States was profound. It meant, among other things, that the job market for unskilled labor was gradually contracting, while the job market for highly trained professionals and semi-professionals was rapidly expanding. Thus in 1900 unskilled laborers comprised about 11% of the total labor force, while professionals comprised roughly 4%, but by 1965 the situation was reversed, so that professional comprised almost 11% while the proportion of laborers in the total work force had declined to around 4% (Horton and Leslie, 1970, p. 289). This vast expansion of jobs at the middle and upper middle levels of the occupational hierarchy created a "vacuum" which had to be filled by mobility from below, since the historical middle and upper classes were not sufficiently numerous to "fill" such industrial "vacancies". Thus it was the "demand-pull" of secular trends in the industrial economy rather than the frontier norms of populism and practicality (though they were indeed present) which made possible the actual "democratization" of higher education and impelled American universities to increasingly produce experts with more narrowly specialized but "salable" professional and vocational skills, rather than the broadly educated and "widely

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*In spite of the popular mythologies and business rhetoric, government regulation and the "New Deal" were actually welcomed by the most "advanced" segment of the business elites, since it was realized that the government could bring market stability, a "functional requisite" of the viable technocratic corporation. As could bring market stability, a "functional requisite" of the viable technocratic corporation. As Domhoff (1967) has documented, Roosevelt and the New Deal were extensively supported by "Business Liberals" most in touch with the development of the technocratic system, while he was largely opposed by smaller businessmen and those most closely identified with the older entrepreneurial-type firms.

read" man of the classical vision. For in fact, the main product of the contemporary American University is people who possess the requisite technical, scientific, and managerial skills to "fill slots" in the industrial economy. And the demand for such "educated" individuals was so great that it meant that the era of the "self-educated man" was indeed over, for all practical purposes, and young people flocked to universities and colleges in unprecedented numbers. To accomodate such an incoming hoard of students, universities sought and received extensive financial subsidies either directly from industrialists or indirectly though their philanthropic tax dodges and, as time went on they received direct aid from state legislatures and federal agencies. (Aid from the latter, of course, had to be carefully camouflaged in the form of a multitude of "special aid" categories, since there is no legal and constitutional machinery for direct and general aid to higher education by the Federal Government. Such "special purpose" grants, in addition, enabled the government agencies to shape the internal character of higher education to the needs of the industrial system (eg., by funding science and engineering heavily, but fine arts and the humanities to a much lesser degree).

Thus in the twentieth century American higher education evolved from a small number of exclusive and elite institutions in "mass" institutions in which access has been "democratized" to a considerable degree. In 1960, for instance, about 38% of the 18-19 year olds in the nation were enrolled in some form of higher education, while by 1969 the figure had risen to fully 53%, *perhaps the highest proportion of "collegiate" young people in any nation in the world. Traditional liberal arts colleges, of course, continued to exist, alongside gigantic state universities, and attempted to perpetuate a somewhat distinctive and older view of the meaning of education and "higher

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*Wattenberg, "Irony Characterized Decade of Change," Cincinnati Enquirer, December 28, 1969.

learning." But in much the same manner that the self-employed and small businessman are in trouble, existing between the interstices and at the margins of the giants of the corporate economy, all but the most prestigious private universities and colleges face tough going in terms of vastly increased costs, relatively fewer resources, and the inability to offer as many or as diverse "services" as the state universities.

But the dominant model of higher education in the twentieth century was formed by the evolution of an interlocking network of large* state universities which originated around the "big ten" universities of the midwest, but which now form a truly nationwide network of institutions. Even though such institutions vary widely in many concrete particulars, at a broader level of analysis the similarities among them are amazing; at this level of analysis they seem to form a roughly homogeneous network of institutions. Such similarities have developed not only because there has come to be a high volume of "horizontal mobility" between institutions by faculty, administrators, and students, but also because the institutions in various parts of the country are linked structurally by academic disciplines which tend to standardize the shape and the content of the curriculum. Not only are they similar in terms of institutional structure and curriculum, but the inter-institutional flow of students, at both the graduate and undergraduate levels, insures that there will be a roughly similar set of student subcultures at every institution. (See Burton R. Clark and Martin Trow, 1969) While it is true that private universities have not been immune to the demands of the "modernizing" industrial order to the same degree as have public institutions, they have not accomodated themselves as fully to the currents of democratization and vocationalism. And while Harvard University

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*Even a moderately sized university in this network has 25,000 students, and many are much larger.

in 1971 more closely resembles Ohio State University--in terms of structure and curriculum--than it does Harvard College in 1700, clearcut differences continue to exist between the newer institutions and those private ones which trace their ancestry to the colonial past.*

Such rapid growth of universities within the twentieth century has forced them to adopt extensively bureaucratic rather than "collegial" modes of social organization, so that universities are typically divided into "divisions" or "colleges" which are further subdivided into academic departments. It is within such academic departments that the only real collegial relations continue to exist, if at all, even though faculty senates and "councils" continue to use the rhetoric of "the community of scholars" rather than that of a bureaucratic division of labor, just as the university catalogue continues to exhibit the rhetorical trappings of the classical view of education of an earlier era. The academic department is, in fact, one of the most salient centers of power within the university since (1) they are part of the national network of scholars in a given field, which through their organized "professional" bodies provide one of the most powerful bonds of horizontal integration between universities, (2) the faculty, either as individual scholars or collectively as departments bring academic prestige (or lack thereof) and lucrative research contracts into the university, (3) perhaps the most salient loyalties of the faculty member is to his department or his academic discipline,

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*Such differences are especially noticeable in the way in which "higher education" is defined, and in the priorities, of the institutional values served. Gross and Grambsch, in a rather exhaustive empirical study summarize their findings as follows:

> "The private university manifests an elitist pattern, being particularly concerned with the student's intellect, with motivation goals relating to faculty well-being, and with position goals relating to equality and prestige. State universities, on the other hand, are more inclined to give precedence (in both perceived and preferred goal structures) to developing qualities in the student other than the purelu intellectual, to offering practical services to citizens, and to adapting to the demands of outside groups and agencies." (1968:112)

Such differences are obviously related not only to the historic roots of the two types of institutions, but also to the continuing differences in "clienteles" served.

rather than to his university as an institution,* and (4) academic departments (and not deans or presidents) alone have the specialized competence to certify students and develope curricula. Thus academic departments have the power resources to collectively impede or obstruct decisions by administrators or boards of trustees. At least the substantive (if not formal) "veto power" of the faculty would prevent any university president or dean from hastily embarking on a course of action in face of serious opposition from the faculty. Presidents of the contemporary university generally perceive themselves to exist in a strange state of "higher powerlessness" in which their main functions seem (to them) to be protection of the institution from "outside meddlers", the mediation of intra-mural tribal war between departments, and the acquisition of ever larger parking lots.**

The facts of the strategic structural position of the academic department within the university, and the often conservative action of the faculty attempting to protect these empirial enclaves are twin facts of profound significance for understanding the internal character and problems of the contemporary university. Faculty members are rewarded by their disciplines for their scholarly contributions to the "advancement of knowledge". They are similarly rewarded for scholarship and research by the university as an institution because by their scholarship and disciplinary eminence they bring academic prestige and research grants and contracts into the university. More prestigious universities perenially "raid" the staffs of those less prestigious ones, holding out the (usually) seductive enticements of reduced teaching loads, higher salaries, and elaborate research facilities. Hence, faculty members, both because

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*See Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals" etc.

**This conception of the University presidency has been most eloquently argued by Kerr, 1963.

of their primary career identities as disciplinary scholars rather than teachers, and because the university's system of institutional rewards (both in terms of prestige and salaries) came to develop as primary values the output of "scholarly" research and the training of professionals, and only secondarily the teaching of its ponderously large body of undergraduate students. The teaching of undergraduates came more and more to be delegated to acedemic apprentices (graduate students) or to second rate professors who could not or would not develop a "respectable" scholarly output. Thus teaching itself came, over time, to be perhaps the least rewarding and least rewarded activity for a majority of those who ran the day-to-day operation of the university. The neglect of undergraduate education and the organization of the university (especially the "Undergraduate College") along business lines which maximized economic--but not necessarily educational--efficiency (by herding large groups of students into lecture halls to hear canned lectures delivered by people who had only a secondary interest in what they were doing) is not unrelated to the contemporary crisis of the American university, as most by now realize.

In addition to the university's very broad function of providing the trained manpower for the industrial state and satisfying the mobility ambitions of the young people, of the American middle classes, universities came to be even more directly integrated with political and economic institutions in the middle of the twentieth century. For the university was called upon to provide "scientific research" in areas defined either directly by economic corporations or indirectly by their "philanthropic" foundations. Even more common were research contracts between the university and various government agencies, covering a range of topics that would stifle the imagination (some of which, it must be admitted, had little to do with the historic norms of "pushing back the frontiers of human knowledge"). Academics increasingly began to be sought after as consultants on a wide variety of scientific, economic, and political matters--although--it must be said that their advice was often ignored

when it conflicted with pre-defined economic or political priorities.*

Such direct connections between the universities and the economic and political segments of the society are not, of course, an entirely new phenomena. Universities, since the latter part of the nineteenth century, had included "public service" as an integral element in their ideological justification, so that the transition between institutions of higher education which were not organically related to the economy and the polity to institutions which were interdependent and interrelated to such exterior realms was not a particularly difficult transition to make or to justify. The involvement of the state universities in agriculture, through Federal and state departments of agriculture and their "extension" agencies is an early example of such rather direct involvement of the university in other civic institutions. The degree of symbiosis between the university and the state governments was especially marked during the Progressive Era of the early 1900's, especially in the Midwestern states. So close was the relationship between the University of Michigan and the State Government (in terms of university research and consultants which informed state policy) that one rather pithy comment of the time suggested that "while other states had a university, the University of Michigan had a statehouse" (source unknown). Even more visible, was the manner in which the universities were "pressed into national service" during WW I, when university psychologists developed intelligence tests (the "Army Alpha" etc.) to enable the army to separate "officer material" from the mass of enlisted men. During

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*The manner in which the government has responded to its own commissioned studies into the nature and causes of civil disorders and violence and the "effects" of pornography are vivid recent cases in point. Such reports were virtually ignored, since their findings were consistant with neither the political or the moral rhetoric of those who sponsored the studies. The government, in fact, seems to have developed a strange combination of the capacity to exhaustively document the social ills of the nation with an equally facile ability to ignore its own information when such information conflicts with the preceptions of politicians, or their preceptions of "public opinions".

the depression of the 1930's, academics and intellectuals formed the nucleus of Roosevelt's so-called "brain trust", which informed much of the New Deal efforts to revive the economic machinery of the nation. But it was during WW II that academics had the distinct feeling of "coming into their own" because they were called upon to provide such a wide variety of essential services in the interest of the wartime emergency, the most publicized of which was the Manhattan project, through which a secluded group of university physicists directed the invention and production of the atomic bomb.

But the universities' service to the government did not end after WW II. It increased, in fact, due partly to the protracted and covert conflict of the "cold war", in which the universities helped directly to build the arsenal of thermonuclear weaponry, helped to devise American "anti-communist" propaganda campaigns for both foreign and domestic consumption, and through its developing social sciences helped to develop information for use in the strategies of "containment" and "counter-insurgency" throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America.* Not always involved in such portentous projects, universities came increasingly to be involved in a wide range of more mundane projects, from the discovery of more "efficient" pesticides, to the investigation of the causes and "cures" of poverty or juvenile delinquency. Some such projects could, in fact, be justified as "humanistic" and for the ultimate benefit of humanity or society, or in the interests of theoretical developments in the state of human knowledge. But other projects were merely undertaken because some agency of corporation had a vested interest in knowing something, and had the money to pay for it. But regardless, such projects were usually lucrative for the university, both in terms of financial rewards and the enhancement of public prestige.

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*The most widely publicized such project is the now infamous "Project Camelot. See Irving Louis Horowitz, "Life and Death of Project Camelot", etc.

Such involvement, however, especially during the height of the cold war, had its price, for it decisively shaped the internal character of the university. For not only did the governmental agencies and foundations come increasingly to hold control over decisive aspects of the university budget and to shape its teaching and research activities to "non-academic" ends, but under the pressures of the cold war the universities, as all other institutions, were pressed into service in the interests of national solidarity in the face of the external (and internal) Communist Menace. Thus there was a very subtle--and occasionally not-so-subtle--stifling of the historic role of "social criticism" that academics and intellectuals had historically played in social life. Perhaps an academic system which was not so directly and organically related to other social institutions (such as the colonial colleges) would be better able to resist such popular currents, but the maintenance of such "institutional neutrality" with regard to Communism was clearly not possible for the twentieth century university, which had intricate and extensive connections to almost every other realm of social life. Overt repression of independent thought which criticized the American status quo was rare, but covert pressures were constant and pervasive.*

It is perhaps no accident that during this period sociology, the discipline more closely associated with social criticism than any other, was largely under the sway of macro-functional theories of Parsons, Davis, and Levy which had usually conservative ideological implications. Indeed, in retrospect, much of the sociology of the late '40s and early '50s seems like a celebration of the fundamental goodness of the American Way of Life (a few more minor adjustments--"fine tuning"--were needed of course, to bring about a real utopia). It was not until the end of the Stalinist era and the

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*See, in this regard, Lazarafeld and Theilens, The Academic Mind, etc.

consequent "thaw" in international relations and the decisive defeat of the McCarthy forces* that intellectuals and academics felt secure enough to engage in vigorous and vocal social criticism. The bell-weather of such changes in sociology and the prelude to the development of a movement of radical dissent among all the social sciences was the publication of C. Wright Mills' The Power Elite in 1956.

It must be admitted in all candor that American society provided a relatively easy target for such a university-based dissident intelligentsia. For American society exhibited glaring and persistent inequality of opportunity in spite of general and sustained affluence throughout the '50s and early '60s; continuing and systematic exclusion of Blacks from most of the amenities of American life; and the suspicion that all was not well in the body politic, which exhibited economic and political elitist "special interest" practices. All of these conditions were in direct violation of the traditional norms and values of the society, and had largely gone unnoticed, ignored, or minimized by the public perceptions of social reality. In addition, as the '60s wore on, it became apparent that the War on Poverty was a cruel failure, and America had involved itself in a Southeast Asian land war on very shakey moral and pragmatic grounds.

Ironically, the most attentive audience of the new social critics was not the political and economic leaders of the society, or the general public as intended, but the student population internal to the university. For the generation of students entering the university in the late '50s and early '60s was in some respects different from earlier ones. Unlike their fathers, who had personally experienced the personal social, and economic dislocations of the great depression and WW II, this younger generation of students had lived most of their lives in a sustained period of economic growth and affluence, and since they had never been seriously deprived (materially, at least), they were motivated less than their fathers were

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*Senator McCarthy had made the historic mistake of the fundamentalist right wing by attacking not only rather vulnerable academicians and intellectuals, but he simultaneously attacked much more powerful economic and political figures. Eventually, he was defeated and disgraced by the more "liberal" wing of his own Republican Party.

by the desire for financial and occupational security and more by what Maslow (1962)* would term the "need" for "self-actualization".** The student cohort of the late '50s and early '60s, in other words, increasingly used the college experience as a mechanism for seeking personal fulfillment and a "better world."*** Such students provided a fertile audience for academic dissidents intent on debunking the folklores of the common culture and dramatizing the social evils of contemporary society. The university, then, by the middle '60s was giving birth to a vaguely leftist student movement intent on reforming, and occasionally on revolutionizing what was perceived as a degenerate social order. The student movement was, moreover, not nearly as polite and erudite as its academic mentors, and gradually developed the habit of speaking and acting-out uncivilly. The movement was committed to ending the Asian war, eliminating racism from American life, and reforming or destroying the corporate economy.**** It was overlapping with (but not co-extensive with) the development of a youth "counter-culture" (See Rozak, 1969) which developed values and mores often in direct opposition to adult culture and The

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*See Abraham Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, etc.

**This change was, of course, relative, since there continued to be large numbers of young people seeking higher education primarily for material advancement and social mobility. This was especially true at the more "vocationally" oriented state colleges and the burgeoning system of "Junior Colleges", which drew large numbers of young people from blue collar families.

***The assumption implicit in this interpretation is, of course, that people who possess material well being and daily security are more likely than those without such security to have either the time or the inclination to inquire into the meanings and practice of authenticity, demodracy, or "the good life". Student activists were drawn overproportionately from the more affluent segments of the student population.

****While it is true, as is often stated, that the activists of the Student Left form nowhere near the majority of students, it is increasingly clear that a majority of students broadly sympathize with its goals, if not its tactics. A Daniel Yanklovich poll, commissioned by the editors of Fortune Magazine in 1969 suggests, for instance, that while the student revolutionaries and "radical" comprised only about 12.8% of the total student population, a much larger proportion of the students (72%) sympathize with the goals--but not the tactics--of the radicals. Additionally, some findings at a small midwestern private university roughly coincides with the Yanklovich findings. Thus it is becoming increasingly clear that student activists are a rather sizable minority themselves, and they appear to represent the attitudes at least, of a vast majority of American university students. Only between 10-20% of the total student population are in any sense of the word "conservative". (Harper, 1970).

American Way. A loosely connected network of local, regional, and national organizations developed to coordinate the development of the movement--among which the Students for a Democratic Society was merely the most publicly visable one. It must be admitted, moreover, that such coordination was neither very effective or efficient--since the "New Left", as it came to be called--was informed by the anti-bureaucratic and anti-pragmatic ethos of the counter-culture.

Paradoxically, one of the most frequent targets of attack of the New Left was the university which gave birth to it, for several reasons. First, since the restrictions and the "amenities" of corporate life were less attractive to students who sought creative self-actualization, the university's increasingly clear role as the prime socializing agency for corporate "slots" became suspect. Second, undergraduate education itself had evolved into a mass "cattle pen" approach and many students, who began to realize that few people in the university had much time or energy devoted to them became increasingly disenchanted with the university as a "creative" environment. Thirdly, it was becoming increasingly clear that the university's much publicized "democratization" extended only so far into the depths of the American system of social stratification, so that poor whites and most blacks were systematically excluded. Efforts to include the American under-class in higher education had been generally met with arguments that such efforts would only "lower standards"--even though, as we have seen, such academic standards were considerably bent out of shape from their historic forms as the university increasingly accomodated itself to the needs of a middle class crucial to the formation of the industrial system. Instead of including the poor in higher education at its best, unique systems were developed (ie., public "Junior and Vocational Colleges") which were "geared to the needs" of the less academically competent--which always seemed to be concentrated among the children of blue collar families, the poor, and especially the non-white ethnic minorities. Such "unique American institutions" generally performed the "cooling-out function" by which students from less affluent situations were generally shunted to less advantageous positions within the corporate economy--that is, to vocational and technical (or "semi-skilled")

positions.* But a fourth and perhaps most important reason that the university itself became suspect was that its willing duplicity in many of the unsavory projects of economics, political, and military elites was gradually unmasked. The university was increasingly perceived by the Student Left as either the unthinking pawn or the willing handmaiden of a repressive "power elite". The facts that the university had often acted, naively perhaps, but nontheless genuinely within the contexts of humanistic values, or that the university itself was the fount of the perspective of the New Left, or that the university had, in fact, provided a modicum of education--even though not in the "classical" format--for multitudes of American young people, were minimized or ignored by student activists of the New Left. Finally, a fifth reason that the university became a prime target of the New Left was because of its (putative) strategic location within the industrial system. Thus there evolved the strategy that "the system" could be altered or shut down by first attacking its prime supplier of manpower and expertize. And the university was especially vulnerable to such assaults as took place at Berekely (19--) and Columbia (19--) since its committment to rational values made it ill equipped to deal with the "tactics of confrontation", as they came to be called.

The public response to all this "thunder on the left" by students and dissident faculty should have been predictable--as situations always so seem in retrospect. For the reactions of the citizens who, after watching a T.V. commercial suggesting that "Colleges are America's Friends", and who subsequently watches Walter Cronkite's videotape replay of the day's demonstration, bomb threat, or seizure of the Ad Building by students who must appear very strange indeed--is not hard to understand. Nor do such dissidents evoke much favor among the upper white collar and professional classes--since their hard won academic credentials are in most cases valued too dearly to watch their alma mater attacked with impunity as

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*See Burton R. Clark, "The Cooling Out Function," etc.

a "corrupt" institution--without a negative reaction. Thus the climate of public opinion, legislative action, and philanthropic largess is becoming increasingly less favorable in comparison to the recent past. And the university finds itself besieged from within and without, simultaneously by the Left and the Right for a multitude of contradictory sins.*

It is in this critical situation that academics and administrators have begun to ask themselves some very fundamental questions about the nature of higher education, and the role the university does and should play in contemporary society. And although some of the more pessimistic parties to the dialogue have already concluded that the university really has no future in American Society, we would rather take it as optomistic that such discussions have finally begun in earnest.

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*It is difficult to imagine, for instance, how the university can simultaneously be guilty as charges for being an "instrument of repression and mindless conformity to the common culture," and a "seed-bed of radicalism, communism, deviance, and degeneration."

III. EPILOGUE

It is a curious experience to write an epilogue to one's analysis of recent history. One is struck anew with the realization of how fast things can change and how rapidly the old "burning issues" have a way of becoming passe and outmoded by history. What external "events" have affected developments with regard to the relationship between the university and the surrounding social order?

The most visable factors are undoubtedly the end of the Viet Namese war and the abolition of the selective service system. Apparently, and in spite of all the rhetoric of the student movement (or the "New Left") about "Humanizing the system" the motive power behind the movement was basically an anti-war and anti-draft sentiment among those most likely to be drafted into the military. Thus as the war and the draft system came to an end, the "social base" that supported student activism and radical scholarship eroded overnight. And the undergraduate enrollment figures which had climbed steadily during the '50s and '60s began to plateau or, in some cases actually decline--suggesting that the existence of the selective service system had worked to inflate university enrollments because being enrolled in a university provided a way, at least temporarily, of avoiding the draft.

The decline in college enrollments which began in the mid '70s was, of course, influenced by many other factors. Perhaps two of the most important ones have been: (1) the changing age structure of the American population--the tail end of the post WW II "baby boom" began to graduate during the early '70s, and the available pool of 19 year-olds has declined; and (2) the gradual "saturation" of a number of job markets--making more tenuous the connection between having a college degree and economic success. Compounding the proliferation of degree holding job-seekers looking for "room-at-the-top", the post war recession (1973) has created objectively <u>less</u> room-at-the-top. Thus the mid-seventies can be aptly characterized as a time in which the ability of the university to produce "certified" job-seekers outran the ability of the corporate economy to produce job openings (at "appropriate" upper-middle class levels). The increasingly common specter haunting the graduating senior is that of being "over-educated" and "overcertified"

for the existing openings in the job market. Thus in recent years the attractiveness of "technical and vocational" post secondary education has undoubtedly increased relative to that of conventional university higher education.* Compounding the effects of these demographic and economic changes was, of course, the change in government policy. The Nixon-Ford administrations decided that federal subsidies of higher education and scholarly research (along with a host of other "social" programs) should be cut back as an attempt to produce a leaner federal budget. Thus federal support of research and graduate fellowships shrunk dramatically, as NDEA, NSF, and NIMH monies began to dry up. The cumulative impact of these converging forces meant that the university now finds itself in a period of retrenchment, belt tightening, and struggle to survive "hard times," when there are fewer students and less largess from foundations and federal agencies to supply critical "system-maintenance" inputs.

In retrospect, the events of the last several years seem to validate the major thesis of this paper outlined in the first paragraphs, namely that the development and internal character of the university is decisively shaped by its interaction with the external events and other institutional spheres that comprise its millieu. Indeed, as events have suggested, the autonomy of the university to shape its own destiny in terms of its internally generated goals and criteria are really quite limited. Several of the options that were being discussed within academia in the late '60s turned out not to be options at all, but rather, visions that greatly underestimated the functional interdependence between the university and its institutional environment. Thus the dream of left wing academicians that the university should disengage itself from entanglements with economic and political elites and become the launching pad for a social revolution in American society seems--in retrospect--like a fantasy divorced from political and economic reality. Similarly, the advice of conservatives as to the solution of the university's problems--that the university should cut such foreign entanglements to resume its former function as the center of "classical and humane" pure knowledge (vs. an applied orientation) seems equally unrealistic. What seems to have happened is

that universities are once again trying to sell their wares in terms of pragmatism and technocratic utility, as they had so successfully during the '50s and early '60s. This is not, however, a "return to normalcy," since the university is not operating from a position of unqualified strength and security as was true during the '50s, but rather now is operating from a threatened and perhaps eroding position within the inter-institutional system. What seems to be going on is that various schools are attempting to consolidate their positions for the forthcoming "hard times." This is not merely a retrenchement, but also involves attempts to create new clienteles within the population, diversify functions served, and generally to work harder to maintain themselves when all sorts of resources necessary for their existence are likely to decline for some time in the forseeable future. All of this need not seem especially gloomy. Some universities probably will not survive the coming decade, and it would seem that the weakly endowed private schools are in an especially precarious position. But the better, more efficient, and more effectively mobilized universities will survive, and perhaps even be strengthened by these efforts.

Finally, it seems worth mentioning that the turbulent '60s were not without their lasting impact. On the negative side, they probably served to re-intensify the hostility from certain segments of the American public that has periodically manifested itself within the history of the nation. This again underlines the ambivalence which those (most culturally fundamentalistic) segments have held toward the university--and its culturally heterodox products. On the positive side, however, the impact of the '60s has also served to democratize the university polity and enrich its internal culture. Thus the radicalism and humanism that developed--especially in the humanities and social sciences--during the '60s seems to have become a permanent feature of the landscape of academia, and has served to revitalize the critical role that intellectuals and academicians played in the classical academies. It will be a long time before social sciences, for instance, will lapse into the somnulescent conformist state that they were in during the chilling days of the cold war, in which they tended to accept without question the perspectives of

economic and political elites, and tended to produce mainly intellectural legitimation for such "establishments." In sum, as the '70s draw to a close American Universities seem to be entering a phase in which, while their existance has become more problematic than in the past, they in fact seem to exhibit a healthier balance between their client-centered and service oriented role and their "prophetic" humanizing role within the society. This, I would argue, is as it should be, and seems an appropriate model for the university in a complex industrial (post industrial?) society. The model is one which, in other words, maintains a healthy balance between its oblication to serve the needs of the community and society of which it is a part and its unique ability to play a critical, humanizing, and prophetic role in the social order.

Omaha, Nebr.

Spring 1977

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A SHORT ANNOTATED READING LIST

For those wishing further reading, the following is a list of readings which parallel the concerns of the forgoing essay and document and analyze in more sharp relief various aspects of the processes by which universities developed. Although no claims are made that the following is by any means an exhaustive bibliography, the readings suggested could be a way to enter the literature of the sociology of higher education. The criteria for selection was that each of the readings not only discuss the development and nature of the modern American university system, but relate its evolution and problems to various aspects of its changing social enviornment. Thus the "inter-institutional" theme developed in the forgoing essay is maintained throughout the suggested readings. The readings are not presented alphabetically, as would be typical in a bibliography, but rather "thematically" in terms of how--and in what order--it would make sense to read them.

I. HISTORICAL ORIGINS

Halsey, A.H.,
1960 "The Changing Functions of Universities," Harvard Educational Review, XXX, (Spring), 119-27.

Halsey, an English sociologist, suggests that the American experience is, in fact, not unique, and outlines a number of developmental processes which, he argues, are common to industiral societies. Compared to universities in pre-industrial societies, whose main social function was that of status differentiation among elites, the university in industrial societies has a greatly expanded role in the production of economic technologies and the maintenance of the dynamic labor-force "needs" of an industrial economy, as well as the traditional functions of status allocation. With regard to the latter, higher education has been the major institutional vehicle for the transition from a pre-industrial (ascribed) status system to that of an industrial society (based on status achievement) has been accomplished. It is in this context that the "democratization" of higher education needs to be understood, according to Halsey.

Ben-David, Joseph, and Awraham Zloczower,
1962 "Universities and Academic Systems in Modern Societies," European Journal of Sociology, 3"45-84.

In contrast to Halsey's arcticle Ben-David and Zloczower present a somewhat less abstract analysis, which treats the growth of universities from a historical and cross-national standpoint. They outline the differences between English, German, and American universities as well as suggest the impacts that each has had on the other and conclude that, for better or worse, the American pattern is becoming increasingly cominant throughout the western world.

Veysey, Lawrence,
1970 The Emergence of the American University, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Especially relevant to the present concerns are the first and second chapters, "The University As an American Institution," and "Utility." This latter chapter documents the gradual development and adptation of the broader social values of "practicality and utility," which ultimately caused the university's justifying rationale to be recast in terms of its "public service". Such developments, alluded to in the foregoing essay, are treated by Veysey from the earlier period between the middle of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth during which, Veysey claims, the whole character of the modern university was decisively shaped.

Clark, Burton R.,
1962 "The Triumph of Vocationalism," from Educating the Expert Society Pp. 237-43, San Francisco, Chandler Publishing Co.

Clark's essay is interesting in that it analyzes some ultimate consequences of trends which Veysey treated historically. Thus Clark's thesis is that changes in the social environment of the university and its relation to American society has brought about the "triumph of vocationalism" as organizing norms informing much of the internal character of the university--in terms of curricula, institutional competition, and student and faculty subcultures. There is little doubt of that influence, but we suspect that had Clark been writing in the late instead of the early '60s he would have been less certain about the "triumph" of the vocational subculture.

Trow, Martin,
1966 "The Democratization of Higher Education," in William Goode (ed.) The Dynamics of Modern Society, Atherton Press, 424-33.

Supplementing Clark's essay in many ways, Trow's essay treats the forces behind the growth in numbers of students, expecially students from non-elite status, in America as well as other countries. These are much the same forces, as it turns out, that are related to the growth of "practicality" and "vocationalism" treated in earlier articles. In addition, Trow analyzes the "quality vs quantity" Question which arose with the democratization of higher education in the middle of the twentieth century, and is still with us in one form or another. His position is optomistic (i.e., that one can have both quality and quantity). Trow's analyzes foreshadows some of the grievances of the New Left by stating that "The apparent gains in tolerance and breadth of perspective of the individual student may be somewhat irrelevant by-products of a preparation for a conformist and subservient place in the bureaucratic institutions which increasingly dominate the political and economic life of the society."

Lowi, Theodore J.,
1970 "Higher Education,: A Political Analysis," Liberal Education, 65,238-57.

Lowi's article is an insightful analysis of the evolution of higher education in response to the emergence and decline of various groupins and strata which provided its "clientele."

II. THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE" A TYPOLOGY OF ASSESSMENTS AND SOLUTIONS

The crisis of the university in the late '60s and early '70s has provoked a plethora of scholarly responses, as well as public ones. Most, perhaps as an analog to the public reaction over the Student Left and disruptions within the university, dealt with issues of "governance" internal to the university. But perhaps second in frequency are reactions and responses which assess the current problems of the university in the context of its relations to the environing society. After reviewing a number of such writings, it became apparent that most of them could be rather crudely grouped into one of three categories suggested by Luria and Luria (1970), in terms of their analysis of the problem and normative suggestion as to what the university should become. Thus the articles in this section are not merely listed in order of the chronology of their concerns, as in the previous section, but rather are grouped thematically.

(1) The University as service station. Those who take this position suggest that the raison d'etat of the university is that it provides necessary or desirable services for the society at large, or other institutional sectors of the society. This conception of the purpose and function of the university grew as American universities underwent the transition from colonial to modern institutions. Not to be solely (or even primarily) concerned with "higher learning" of the knowledge-for-knowledge-sake variety, the university should become the "problem-solver" for other agencies and the public-at-large, providing the degree of expertise which it is uniquel qualified to provide. No "problem" is seen as being too mundane or, with proper funding, too grandoise for the attention of the university. Furthermore, since the university is only committed as a corporate body of "teaching, scholarship, and service," no value judgement is possible about the desirablilty (or lack thereof) of what kind of service is rendered to whom. Thus any attempt to corporately direct the direction of services would mean the creation of a "politicized university" and is seen as a violation of "institutional neutrality." Thus while the university is to be intimately embraced in the service of others, it rarely difines the goals and ends of that service, which is conceived of as the proper domain of others. The university could promote social change, so long as the methods it used and

the changes sought were rather innocuous to the rest of the society. But to seek changes in the face of opposition from large segments of the public, governmental and economic institutions is to be avoided, since the university would be "biting the hand that feeds it."

The present troubles of the university are said to be the result of ineffiecient communicative and connective ties to other institutions. What is needed, therefore, is a more efficient "super granting" agency, which would make up for certain current deficiencies and imbalances, as well as some mechanism for universities to get more accurate "feedback" about "needs" from governmental, occupational, welfare, and other agencies it could serve more effectively. The internal difficulties of the universities (although not treated extensively in the selections presented below) are generally seen as technical and organizational problems, which can be solved by certain structural adjustments (e.g. smaller classes and more contact between undergraduate and faculty) rather than a radical restructuring of the university.

Although not perhaps as popular a view of the university as it was until the middle sixties, the "service station" conception of the university still continues to inform the general debate about the role of the university in American society. The leading selection under this heading is a series of excerpts from The Uses of the University, by Clark Kerr, former president of the University of California complex. Kerr suggests that because the contemporary university is so large and diverse, and because a coherent rationale for its existence has become almost impossible, the term "multiversity" (which he coined) is a more descriptive term. The fact that a "service station" orientation pervades Kerr's work is illustrated by the fact that he sees the multiversity as having problems at "the bottom and the top": That is, it should see to it that there is a better fit between its graduates skills and the needs of a dynamic economy (the bottom) and that it should be concerned (at the "top") with the quality and quantity of research output. To facilitate both of these goals he calls for the foundation fo a "National Foundation for Higher Education," one would suppose, along the lines of the National Science Foundation. After suggesting several areas of current concern--to outside agencies--he suggests that the most relevant criterion of success for the multiversity is "adjustment to its environment." By this criterion he finds the present multiversity system a rather spectacular success (this was written before the student up-

risings in his own university!). Kerr suggests that the present multiversity has "no living peers in the search for new knowledge; and no peers in all history among institutions of higher learning in serving so many segments of an advancing civilization. Inconsistent internally as an institution, it is consistently productive." (p.45)

The second selection, "Governance and Functions," is also by Kerr, who at this time is responding to the general debate about the "governance" of the university. Kerr suggests that "governance follows function" or, in other words, that the general issue of governance cannot be treated unless the functions of the university are sorted out in terms of the clienteles they serve, each of which, one presumes is to be given a "piece of the action." With some of his "functions" it is reasonably clear who the clientele would be (e.g. professional training) but less so with others (e.g. a "holding operation" where students "find themselves". Kerr calls this solution one based on "pragmatic pluralism" rather than on any unified set of principles, values, or ideologies. In the last article in this section, Eldon Johnson similarly argues for a more complete "partnership" between the university, government, and industry. In spite of the title, "Educational Cutting Edge for Social Change," one can only infer that Johnson wants the university to "cut" for social change mainly when it is congruent with the desires of other institutional sectors. Nevertheless, Johnson eloquently makes the point that "the isolated institution becomes irrelevant".

(2) The University as Frontier Post. Those who view the university as a frontier post also believe that it should be intimately involved in the affairs of the society but, unlike those who hold the "service station" conception, they feel that the university should take a more active role in shaping the character of the society. The growth of this viewpoint was an integral part of the growth of student and faculty activism during the early and middle sixties. Operating from the value assumptions of a radical humanism, they suggest that the university has too willingly adapted itself as a mechanism of "training" whereby students are socialized to "fill slots" in the corporate economy rather than to provide an atmosphere in which there are alternatives for creative self-development. They would suggest that the ideology of "service of society" has too often become a pious fraud which disguises the University's duplicity in the often

unsavory (from their viewpoint) projects of political, military, and economic elites. The university should, according to these commentators, become more active in its role of social criticism, and should become an active "lobby" in promoting social change, even in the face of opposition from other organized sectors of American society. It can do so because of its strategic role in supplying trained manpower and research expertise to these other sectors. Thus the university should not be afraid to take corporate stands and, where possible, political action to bring about the end of the war, to end recism, to reform American foreign policy, to alleviate poverty, or to make the economy or the government more responsive to the wishes of the populace, etc. To these ends, the university should look first at its own admissions policies, which often descriminate against the poor and the Black, and establish some sort of selective policy about the nature of the services it provides for external agencies. In short, these analysts hold that the university should become an institution which actively strives to "humanize" the social order.

The article by George S. Rothbart, "Ivory Tower or modern Building?" is from a collection of papers written as faculty responses to the abortive faculty and student strike at San Francisco State College in 1968-1969. After a very broad and somewhat abstract analysis of the nature and development of higher education, Rothbart suggests that the universities do much of the "dirty work" of the society in selecting out (rather than developing) talent. Such a function restricts the mobility access of the poor and minority groups. In the following selection from The New Industrial State John K. Galbraith suggests that while education has been sucked into the orb of the new industrial system, educators have yet to become aware of the dependency of the industrial system on the university. He argues at length that higher education is the "critical lever" which could "humanize" the system, and suggests that universities strive to regain control of their own funding and scholarly activities. This could be accomplished, according to Galbraith, by making the industrial system pay a "tax" for providing it with trained manpower and research, which could then be used to finance "non-utilitarian" activities (e.g. the arts, social criticism, philosophy). This view is echoed in the following article "Public University: Prospect of Power," by Lord and Spiro. They suggest that "there is a mistaken view

that 'autonomy' is bought by political quiesence," when in fact the three functions of teaching, research, and service all mean that the university is, in the broader sense, not "neutral" or "autonomous." Lord and Spiro think that educators overstate the control-potential of industrial and political bodies. In the next article Harold Taylor, former president of Sarah Lawrence College, argues that since the notion of a"neutral" institution is a pious fraud, the university had better make up its "corporate mind" as to what ends its energies will serve. The final article in this section, by Jerald B. Johnson, a law student at the University of Illinois, is entitle "The University as Problem Solver: Creativity and the Ghetto," and focuses on the universities involvement in the issue of recial discrimination and outlines some possible steps it could take to alleviate the situation.

(3) The University as Ivory Tower. Most recently there has been a renaisance in popularity of the "traditionalist" position about the nature and purposes of higher education, articulated earlier by Hutchins (1936) and Brazun (1959). In this view the university should concern itself only with the pursuit and transmission of "higher learning" in its classical sense. The character of knowledge it should pursue and transmit should be determined primarily by academic and theoretic criteria, rahter than the practical needs of some external political or economic agency. "Higher education" in this sense should have little to do with "business management," "hotel management" or other forms of vocational or technical training. The product of the university should, therefore, be wise men rather than trained personnel. Those who hold this view typically assert that to wich to improve the condition of society and to provide technical and vocational training are praiseworthy motives, but ones which are best carried out by other agencies than those of higher learning. According to these "neo-classicists" trouble in universities began when universities began to adapt themselves primarily to the needs of other institutions so that there was a vulgarization in the "noble" pursuit of higher knowledge. Trouble also resulted from the urge to "democratize" the university, which is naturally an aristocracy of ability and academic expertise, so that the university admitted into its midst legions of those who had no aptitude or inclination toward living "the life of the mind". Such democratization naturally led to a degradation of authority within the academy, since all wanted a portion of power

third, as it turns out, to summon the police or the National Guard." Finally, Edward Shoben, in "Cultural Criticism and the American College," argues that the "service station university" with its extensive ties to government and industry has blunted the ability of the university to provide its historic and most necessary function, that of "social criticism." He suggests that the best way to promote cultural criticism is to maintain corporate "institutional neutrality," which would allow individuals within the university the right of dissent. Like others, he suggests that when the university takes a corporate stand on political matters it invites public reprisals which would limit freedoms necessary for the university and the society.

(4) Mixed and Creative Positions. This section includes three final articles which we found interesting and suggestive, but were unable to classify into any of the three categories in the foregoing typology of positions. Thus they are grouped seperately here as a "residual category." Robert S. Morison in "Some Aspects of Policy-Making in the American University," suggests that the university should be more cognizant of the "latent" consequences of its own activities, and very broadly, try to control them--short of direct political action. Thus, for example, he suggests that the university must develop broad research policies--but not limit the right of particular individuals in particular investigations. Thus the university could actively encourage certain kinds of research (e.g. pollution control system vs. missile guidance systems) in terms of criteria of moral choice and social need, without explicitly "forbidding" any particular investigation. Finally, he argues that while the university should do its utmost to faster "social criticism" it should not be the main social critic. In the next selection, "Power struggle to Convert the University," D.P. Gardner argues that the university itself should not be the captive of either the political Left or the Right, but should actively encourage students and faculty to be politically engaged in terms of their own values, and protect their right to do so. He seems to feel that the best course is activism on the part of the university members, while maintaining an official "institutional neutrality." And finally, Morton Levitt in "The University and Society," makes probably the most unique suggestion. After reviewing three positions about the university, roughly as suggested by out topology, he suggests what he claims is a "middle ground," namely that higher education institutions become split into three main types, each of which would have a legitimate function for American society: (1) "experimental" or "free"

universities, which would be student-run and "activist," (2) avowedly technical insittutions, which would be singlemindedly concerned with technical training, and (3) universities structured around traditional ideals of "higher" scholarship and neutrality vis-a-vis the surrounding society.

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